Kerbside EV Charging: The promise and the pitfalls of monopoly deployment

As Australia accelerates its transition to electric vehicles (EVs), the spotlight is increasingly turning to public charging infrastructure and in particular the potential of kerbside EV charging to support widespread adoption. With more than 300,000 EVs now on Australian roads, the need for convenient, accessible, and equitable charging options has never been clearer. The Electric Vehicle Council (EVC), among others, strongly supports kerbside charging as a vital part of Australia’s net zero transition, especially for residents without off-street parking.

However, a recent proposal by Citipower, Powercor, and United Energy (collectively “CPU”) to install and operate 100 kerbside chargers through a waiver from ring-fencing rules has ignited a robust debate about how - and by whom - this infrastructure should be deployed.

This robust debate is not new. Ring fencing waivers have been allocated in spite of significant opposition in submissions and forums. The result risks "innovation capture"- where only the incumbent can innovate, under terms they control. So, after a review of the merits of kerbside charging and the CPU application, we’ll turn our attention to the mix of institutional, political, and practical realities that sound caution for waiver decisions.

The Case for Kerbside Charging

Kerbside chargers, especially those mounted on existing utility power poles, offer a practical and cost-effective way to expand the public charging network. In dense urban areas or suburbs where residents lack driveways or garages, such chargers provide a crucial alternative to home charging. Programs like the Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA)’s $2.4 million initiative to roll out 250 chargers in over 60 local government areas across Victoria, New South Wales and South Australia highlights the growing interest in kerbside charging.

The Electric Vehicle Council has consistently advocated for such rollouts, arguing they:

• Reduce range anxiety, particularly for apartment dwellers and renters;
• Support EV adoption across socioeconomic lines;
• Promote cleaner air and quieter neighbourhoods.

But while the concept of the infrastructure itself may be widely supported, the question of who should deliver it remains contentious.

The Citipower Powercor United (CPU) Proposal: Accelerating Access or Evading the Market?

CPU has asked the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) for a waiver from ring-fencing provisions that prohibit regulated monopoly electricity distributors from participating in competitive markets like public EV charging. Their proposal would see CPU trial the installation of 100 pole-mounted kerbside chargers across suburban and regional Victoria.

CPU argues that the market has failed to deliver adequate infrastructure in these areas, citing low investment interest from third-party providers. They claim their involvement would:

• Accelerate charger rollout;
• Provide cost-effective solutions;
• Deliver network data to inform better planning.

But a review of the detail of submissions to the AER, especially those prepared by industry stakeholders and policy analysts, contests nearly every aspect of this argument.  The counter argument is that EV charging infrastructure is constrained by the very slow rollout of grid connections taking place, not by too-few Charge Point Operators (CPO).

Challenges with the CPU Waiver Application - Market Failure is Unproven

Submissions argue that CPU’s claim of “market insufficiency” is unsubstantiated. There is no clear data showing that third-party providers have failed to deploy infrastructure or that tenders and proposals have been rejected. The lack of concrete evidence — such as unmet demand metrics or failed initiatives — suggests the claim of market failure is speculative.

Moreover, the submissions highlight CPU’s own role in potentially hampering third-party access, through control of pole access, delays in approvals, or lack of transparent data.  As merchant giant BP, powering cars for a century notes, “EV charging infrastructure is constrained by the very slow rollout of grid connections taking place, not by too-few Charge Point Operators (CPO)”.

Monopoly Involvement Threatens Competition

Allowing a monopoly network business to enter a competitive market also poses significant risks. CPU controls:

• Access to poles and connection points;
• Proprietary network data;
• The ability to set internal transfer pricing.

This gives CPU a structural advantage over private charge point operators and risks creating a path-dependent monopoly. Over time, this absence of competition has the potential to lead to higher prices, lower service quality, and reduced innovation: all outcomes that run contrary to the public interest.

Equity Concerns in Site Selection

CPU’s methodology for choosing charging locations by prioritising areas with high EV uptake may exacerbate inequality.  These areas typically align with affluent, inner-city suburbs that already attract private investment. Conversely, regions with low EV uptake may be underserved precisely because of the lack of public chargers, a nuance CPU’s proposal fails to address.

Cost-Effectiveness Claims Lack Evidence

CPU claims it can deliver chargers more cheaply than competitors, but offers no cost breakdowns, return on investment projections, or benchmark comparisons. Without such analysis, assertions of efficiency and cost-effectiveness are impossible to validate.

Moreover, CPU admits that the chargers installed during the trial may be redundant by 2031 due to rapid technological and policy changes and yet it offers no risk assessment or plan for dealing with this possibility.

Financial Transparency is Minimal

CPU proposes to cap investment at $1.2 million, with revenue of around $200,000 per year. While this is framed as a small-scale trial, the lack of clarity on:

• Maintenance costs,
• Cost recovery mechanisms,
• Pricing for users, and
• Exit strategies for stranded assets,

all raise red flags. The AER had asked for further detail on how CPU will fund the rollout and manage the losses, but these concerns remain inadequately addressed.

Weak Justification for Ring-Fencing Exemptions

The central flaw in CPU’s application is its claim that adhering to ring-fencing guidelines will harm consumers by preventing “efficient” deployment. The submissions generally counter this, arguing that the ringfencing safeguards in place exist for a reason; to ensure transparency, neutrality, and fair competition. If relaxed without robust justification, these safeguards lose their power.

The Alternative: Enabling Competition

The submissions from non-network businesses recommend a different path forward: one that supports kerbside charging infrastructure while supporting competitive interests.

These include market enabling changes to:

• Standardised LV kerbside connection agreements;
• Fair access to pole mounting and data;
• Connection timeframes and tariffs that apply equally to all providers;
• Published connection charges for transparency;
• Obligations for distributed network service providers (DNSPs) to release publicly network capacity and hosting data.

Such a framework would enable third-party investment, level the playing field, and ensure that DNSPs act as facilitators for, and not competitors within, the kerbside charging market. This will also ensure the purpose of ring fencing is upheld. 

Institutional, political, and practical realities

The reason policy makers and economists have historically called for strong ring fencing is that without it there is a high risk of entrenched monopoly power, the stifling of competition, a distortion of price signals and consumers who have fewer choices and slower innovation. The absence of ring fencing can lead to regulatory lock-in, lack of scalability, stranded assets, or market barriers that are expensive to unwind - areas raised in submissions by non-network stakeholders to the AER on Ring Fencing waiver applications.

And there’s a compelling logic in these arguments which is not front and centre of previous waiver applications. But why? Let’s take a step back and think carefully about the implications of the CPU applications, firstly on the competitive market, and ultimately, consumers.

“Trial” Framing Downplays the Long-Term Risk

Networks can frame these proposals as small-scale, low-cost "trials" with limited customer impact. The language of trials makes them appear temporary and masks the fact that first mover advantage in infrastructure markets locks in future dominance, particularly with physical assets like pole-mounted chargers. 

Public Interest Language Confuses the Debate

CPU argues it is acting in the “public interest” by filling infrastructure gaps and accelerating EV uptake. This language is becoming commonplace – community batteries and community power networks for example.  And these ideas have appeal.

But public interest is not the same as public responsibility. When a monopoly claims to serve the public interest while impeding competition, it creates a false binary: "either we do it, or nobody will." That is not upholding a public responsibility. 

Networks control the data and are not required to share this data with the market: they know where hosting capacity exists, what network constraints look like, and where upgrades are planned. Third parties don’t.

That information asymmetry gives them a strategic advantage.

Weak Enforcement of Ring-Fencing must be addressed

Ring-fencing guidelines exist to prevent exactly this kind of conflict and yet recent experiences show waivers are being granted. This should be based on good evidence that competition or alternative approaches are not viable and real independent auditing of the benefits.

Good regulation of ring fencing (and other methods like sandboxing) means:

• Focusing on frameworks
• Using trials to test genuine market mechanisms, not just technology Enforcing ring-fencing strictly
• Demanding the necessary independent analysis, and most importantly
• Treating monopoly proposals to enter non-monopoly markets with scepticism.

Why the Conflict Is Both Real and Dangerous

There is a risk that networks acts both as gatekeeper and competitor, controlling access to poles and data while competing with third-party operators. This increases the real or perceived risk of stranding, distorts the market and stifles innovation, leaving consumers worse off in the long run. The question is should a monopoly be allowed to dominate new markets just because they already control the infrastructure? Arguably, there should be no exceptions for “trials” that have lasting consequences.

Conclusion: A Cautionary Tale for the Future of EV Infrastructure

The road to net zero must not only be fast - it must also be fair, transparent, and future-facing. Kerbside charging infrastructure is vital for accelerating Australia’s EV future but how it is rolled out matters just as much as how quickly. Submissions on all sides rightly champion the benefits of such infrastructure, but their responses to the CPU proposal flag concerns about allowing monopoly businesses to expand into contestable markets. And highlight what actually needs solving. 

It’s essential regulators recognise that expanding monopoly control under the banner of transition or speed risks long-term harm to both consumers and competition. If competition is sidelined in favour of expediency, consumers risk being locked into higher costs and fewer choices for decades.

What may seem like an easy fix and feel safe also runs the risk of restructuring the market in favour of the incumbent. A cautionary tale indeed.